By Manuel Hevia Frasquieri
Extensive film reports on the gigantic popular revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya throughout 2011 described the massive use by protesters of Internet platforms on social networks. Those young people exchanged all kinds of slogans, complaints or received indications from the organizations that led those riots, maintained an interaction with other protesters with whom they met in parks and avenues, transferred live images to the press or messages on the web about what was happening.
The new tools made it possible to make visible throughout the world, according to patterns dictated by Washington in the platforms and social groups, the intensity and violence of the anti-government protests and their police repression. Years later, a prominent adviser to U.S. politics would comment on those events and what it meant for his country’s political actions to integrate these networks into its diplomatic tools, converted into ” accelerators of a supposed democratic change in the Middle East.”
While those events were taking place in 2011, some covert operations sponsored by USAID and the NED, visibly related to US special services, had been running for three years before to instigate what the Americans themselves called a “Cuban Spring” in the style of the Middle. East.
Seditious new programs underway
An information document prepared by USAID on the secret program “Support for Cuban civil society” dated January 28, 2009 in San José, Costa Rica, constitutes irrefutable proof of the seditious and interfering nature of these projects. The program was promoted by USAID through its ” Office of the Transition Initiative” (OTI), with the participation of other institutions such as Creative Associates International of Costa Rica and Communications, Control Systems and Signal Processing , and other entities that would be incorporated. successively or they would act in close coordination from other ongoing parallel projects.
This program would be extended for an initial period between 2008 and 2011, following the rule of most of its projects, which renew their monetary allocations in subsequent fiscal years.
The program revealed the mastery of a high level of data and information on the Cuban internal reality, the result of previous studies of the operative situation typical of the intelligence activity.
This document cynically reflected their concerns about the obstacles and the risk they faced in carrying out these actions within Cuba given the existing hostility against their programs. This could explain the application by USAID of strong security protocols for its subcontractors as seen in their working documents.
They cynically valued the economic crisis in the country as a strategic opportunity for their objectives, which greatly facilitated the development of their subversive programs internally.
With total brazenness they expressed in their original documents that the critical situation of the Cuban economy ” diminishes the legitimacy of the Cuban government and increases the motivation of citizens to change . “
The mega project “Support for Cuban civil society undoubtedly instituted a new subversive model that has maintained its vitality to this day.
He outlined as a “Mission” to promote ” the transition in Cuba, to get the country out of stagnation through tactical initiatives and to set in motion the process of transition towards democratic change.”
In defining the ultimate success their promoters aspired to, they stated: 1) “A variety of citizen platforms are solidly established as legitimate community organizers (they viewed them as vehicles for community involvement).” 2) “Community platforms are actively involved in change processes (they were conceived as field initiatives promoting effectiveness from the bottom up).”
The last statement of the document finished off a retrograde and confusing approach by postulating: “Ultimately, success means that when the opportunity for possible socio-political reforms appears, Cuban society is prepared to be part of the conversation.”
The enemy tried to ignore the ability of the Cuban people to decide their future. Our society has more than demonstrated that it is prepared to take on the socio-economic changes that the nation needs. The majority approval of its new Constitution of the Republic is evidence of this.
According to this program, USAID established solid points of view for a long-range seditious and conspiratorial work by conceiving in a first phase the construction of “ citizen platforms”, structured, prepared and with various purposes; the “ alternative mass communication platforms” with “ mass access, intelligent and uncensored content” , and the so-called “ spaces for mass meetings , not threatening to the state ”.
Behind the external appearance of these formulations that have a recognized social identity in the world, lies the deceptive background of the enemy who aspires to use these social mechanisms as a device of hostility and hatred against the Revolution in a renewed attempt to restore an abolished system. for our people since 1959.
The enemy tries to deceive the world by denying the legitimacy of the citizen platforms that emerged in the heat of the Cuban Revolution for more than sixty years, while trying to manufacture and proclaim others that provide room for the interests of mercenaries, traitors and annexationists at the service of the U.S. empire.
These formulations were not a dead letter or a theoretical exercise since they were carried out at full speed against Cuba as was the covert operation Zunzuneo, an alternative communication platform that moved between 2009 and 2011 masked behind a social messaging network that reached more than 45 thousand users mainly young people and the organization of some 1,331 groups,
The “Support to Cuban civil society” program claimed an “unprecedented significant achievement” with the creation of Zunzuneo, which was aimed at promoting independent communications “that would provide future access to the mobile phones of more than 400,000 Cubans.”
This program was also attributed ” a significant growth in the countercultural movement” of youth in the capital, attributing as an achievement an alleged “march against violence held in November 2009”. An incident like this had taken place on that date as part of a provocation organized by internal counterrevolutionary elements, in which some young people instigated by them had paraded between G and J streets in the Vedado neighborhood, which had no major significance in the population.
A second phase of the subversive work of this program was referred to “ supporting initiatives for accountability from the bottom up” , which sought to transfer concerns that they classified as “legitimate” to the leaders of the communities, so that they became in ” public, viable and successful pressure”, as one more form of pressure against local authorities.
The latter was not something new. It is a basic component of the doctrine of the soft coup collected in the manuals of “nonviolent struggle” of the American political scientist Gene Sharp, which served as a doctrinal framework for subversive actions during the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and later in the so-called revolutions of colors and the Arab Spring. It is currently praised in the political discourse of the Cuban-American right and by terrorist organizations in Miami.
This methodology is the main component of the “Model for social change” proposed by this enemy program.
It advocates the strengthening of community leadership and structure at the grassroots level, the succession of “small victories” that increase community motivation and participation, and bottom-up pressures in favor of socio-economic reforms; According to this program, this would make possible new international reformist pressures on the country and finally alleged negotiations with the government in favor of reforms that would include the participation of civil society.
But the model of civil society in Cuba that the enemy conceives is contrary to the majority participation of social, political and mass organizations inspired by a revolutionary course that defines the character of our socialist model. Obviously, the enemy also excludes from this “model for social change” the economic war that it carries out against Cuba and the millionaire appropriations from USAID itself and the media war and subversive influence that permanently act on the Cuban social environment.
These are precisely its levers to try to force this supposed “change” and they constitute the main subversive arsenal to push the country towards destabilization and internal chaos.
A novel element of this subversive program is the work directed against “key people” within the population that it segments or divides not because of their age, economic, cultural or social position but because of their supposed “loyalty to the regime.”
This introduced a new criterion for selecting the “potential” in the country to work for the enemy, undoubtedly fickle and arbitrary, copied according to its own sources from the experiences of the Serbian opposition movement OTPOR in the so-called color revolutions, which segment the population into five groups.
Disregarding any analysis of the inconsistency of this formula introduced in this USAID program, I will limit myself simply to explaining it to readers.
Group 1 is considered by the enemy as the “actively loyal”. But the main emphasis of his future influencing work would fall on the citizens whom he allegedly classified as “passively loyal” (group 2) and the so-called “neutrals” (group 3).
Among the “passively loyal” the enemy ranked “citizens skeptical but sympathetic to the regime.” Among the “neutrals” he capriciously placed the self-employed, small farmers and black market operators, considering them as part of the “equation for a sociopolitical change . “
They considered that the fundamental challenge of working on these two groups was psychosocial, to counteract their apathy and hopelessness and finally achieve their wish “ in favor of change ”.
The immediate objective of this program was to incorporate respectively groups 2 and 3 into the categories of “passive disloyal” (group 4) and “active disloyal” (group 5), converting, in his words, ” the latent into action”, which it meant endowing this action with an offensive and openly counterrevolutionary nature.
Among the ” disloyal passives” the enemy cataloged equally Catholic religious people, de-socialized young people and bloggers in the networks whom he considered increasingly confrontational, as well as the citizens of the “underground culture who negotiate spaces for the free expression”.
Among the “disloyal assets” he included counterrevolutionary elements, which he evaluated as ” lacking strategy, coordination and tangible messages, disconnected from the average citizen, who had lost stature and international relevance, although they maintained qualities such as courage and staying power” .
Regardless of the superficiality or incongruity of such segmentation, the enemy essentially aspired to push so-called passive citizens into ” a process of regime change . ” To do this, it promoted a methodological design aimed at identifying them, gaining their trust, stimulating them to action with goals and agendas for change, developing leadership skills, structuring them, supporting their actions and forming them into citizen networks. These components remain valid in the action of the enemy at this time.
Among the social sectors considered as strategic, USAID and its government included in this program university students, youth and those they call “ the counterculture ”, base Catholic citizens, small farmers, Afro-Cubans, the self-employed, the LGBT community and victims affected at that time by a hurricane in three provinces, priorities that they still maintain.
Program Achievements Considered by USAID
The program acknowledged having obtained up to that time different “achievements” in its administration and implementation within Cuba, which demonstrated its illegal and interfering character. Apart from a possible falsehood or exaggeration in the data provided in this report, USAID brazenly declared that it had succeeded in associating more than 30 NGOs from fifteen Latin American countries in these plans, establishing “ working relationships” with a network of more than one hundred young Catholics, maintain relationships of trust with one hundred and twenty self-employed and university students from four cities in the country.
It also recognized an initial relationship with more than 120 young people who were figures of the “counterculture” and a possible future relationship with more than five hundred potential “beneficiaries” from other sectors. Lastly, they referred to the “launching of an initiative to establish a local training center for social activists”, whose existence it was not possible to determine in this historical investigation.
Finally, the program recognized more than 47 donations approved by your government with a figure in excess of $ 2.32 million, with $ 1 million of expenses executed up to that moment. It admitted access to material assistance that allowed them to directly deliver 70 laptops, 40 cell phones and 220 USBs and external hard drives to their “beneficiaries”, as well as the “presence” of the program in six Cuban provinces such as Pinar del Río, La Havana, Villa Clara, Camagüey, Holguín and Santiago de Cuba, in a first stage.
The evaluation of the “achievements” obtained up to that point reflected USAID’s optimism and its confidence that in 2011 they would have achieved the objectives set out in that program. But once again he underestimated the Cuban Revolution.
The cases of Allan Gross and Zunzuneo contributed to the objectives of the program “Support for Cuban civil society”,
At a time when the program analyzed in this historic essay was being vigorously deployed, USAID’s undercover North American subcontractor Allan Gross had arrived in the country in 2009 as an employee of Development Alternative, Inc. (DAI), illegally introducing information communications media with which he supplied and trained independent internal networks to ensure future interaction between the small cells created and free satellite access to the Internet.
It was another secret USAID project operated by a communications technology expert who had worked in more than fifty countries. According to the press, he had developed satellite systems of this nature during the US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Alan Gross was jailed and later tried by the Cuban courts.
In the judgment handed down by the courts, their intention to create conditions for the dissemination of distorted information on the Cuban reality and the promotion of civil disobedience actions whose source of information could not be detected by the authorities was proven.
At that time another dangerous USAID covert operation known by the name of “Zunzuneo” was also deployed, which moved in the telecommunications sector, which promoted as a disguise a gigantic social messaging network for young people with entertaining themes. and depoliticized related to art, sports, music or other curiosities. Zunzuneo ”was designed especially for Cuba by the enemy at a millionaire cost and covertly installed a horizontal communication platform between cell phones of young Cuban users who were not aware of this new hoax.
Due to its importance, this historical investigation will provide the reader in the next essay with the way in which this operation was articulated internationally based on unpublished documents from USAID and its hired mercenaries.
Many readers will agree with me that the Allan Gross and Zunzuneo cases were two covert operations run by the CIA and paid for by USAID at a millionaire cost.
They were undoubtedly novel high-tech projects organized meticulously but inspired and put at the service of evil and hatred towards Cuba, at a time when Internet access was developing despite the obstacles of the US economic blockade and which sought to create platforms of group messaging strengthening an obviously innocent and depoliticized relationship of young users to create the seed of small cells within the social network, outside of all control of our authorities.
It was also part of a gradual work, in stages, designed from a global and strategic USAID program seeking to scale in the future to the confrontation of messages with more confrontational points of view, taking advantage of any favorable situation to continue paving the way towards the projected regime change.
After the failure of the operations of Allan Gross and Zunzuneo, Radio and TV Martí announced in 2013 the operation «Piramideo», with similar purposes: to create a social network of “friends” with USAID funds and to structure a new messaging platform. against Cuba.
The following year, the “Commotion” program, paid for by the United States Government, which unsuccessfully planned to illegally establish a wireless WI-FI connection within Cuba, would also be exposed .
The fallacy of a Cuban Spring came crashing down.
All these projects were part of a vast, encompassing subversive plan such as that of “Support for Cuban civil society”, among other 479 programs, which from then until now have marched against Cuba with the approval of the United States Government, through calculated monetary contributions. in one hundred forty-eight million, one hundred twenty-one thousand, three hundred and fifty dollars  ($ 148, 121,350).
I do not want to end without providing our readers with new elements about USAID’s devious conduct in the implementation of its Democracy Against Cuba programs, which it carries out as an independent federal agency under the control of the US State Department.
The strict security protocols USAID provides its spies
If anyone has any doubts about the conspiratorial nature of these projects, I invite you to read textual fragments of a security protocol delivered by the CREA CR institution, precisely one of the promoters of the USAID program analyzed, supplied to its emissaries who traveled to Cuba in those years.
The text alludes to some guidelines for an “emergency plan” to be followed in the event of the arrest or questioning of the visitor – understood to be a USAID subcontractor – by the Cuban authorities.
It could be something unusual in the world for a foreign NGO to instruct a simple tourist visiting a country for the summer what should be the behavior to maintain in case of being detained or interrogated for acts of a political nature.
In the narrative of these indications, USAID’s interest in not disclosing any information about the organization that sends it, the content of the program or its counterparts, the objective of its trip, much less admitting contacts with “counterrevolutionary or anti-government elements, stands out. ” During his stay, all of which evidences the conspiratorial atmosphere of these visits to Cuba. I offer you some original excerpts from these guidelines.
“Story about the reason for being in Cuba
“[…] Interrogation can occur informally on the street and be taken to the police station or detention center, in your hotel room or at the airport upon arrival or departure from Cuba.
During any questioning (or any other conversation on the subject), do not mention CREA, the CREA program, or your counterparts in Cuba.
“During detention or interrogation, the usual procedure for the Cuban authorities to operate is to scare you, confuse you, and use any psychological power that they might use against you.
“His primary objective during the interrogation is to remain calm, to make them understand that they are not going to achieve anything with this questioning and to continue saying that he does not understand what they think he has done wrong.
“Even though there is never total certainty, trust that the authorities are not trying to harm you, but to scare you. Committing physical harm to foreigners by the authorities is extremely rare. Remember that the Cuban government prefers to avoid bad press reports abroad, so a beaten foreigner does not suit them.
“As a general rule, one resource that is usually useful is to continue acting like any tourist, playing dumb and playing the one who doesn’t understand why they are being questioned.
“Even if those who question you insist that you did something wrong or that you spoke to someone they did not like, as a general rule you should continue to be the one who does not understand why they are making such a mess.
“Never admit to having done something wrong, much less if you do not have a representative from your Embassy by your side.
“Always keep in mind that nothing that you have done during your trip is illegal, in any way, in any democratic and open society. That way, you will be able to maintain a calm appearance during questioning.
“If the interrogation is prolonged or formalized by taking you to a police station, demand your right to contact your Embassy directly. Continue to be the one who does not understand what the problem is that they have with you.
“There will be questions about the people you have met with, the reasons why you have talked or met with specific people, the true purpose of your trip, your goals in being in Cuba, your relationships with foreign organizations that oppose you. the Cuban government and similar issues.
“During questioning, always remember that these people often do not have details about what you have done or failed to do, even though they act as if they know everything.
“If you are asked about specific people that you have met or talked to, you can deny the meeting or you can acknowledge it if there is no point in denying it at the time.
“If you decide to admit, always explain that you have met and talked with dozens of people and that it is something you always like to do with the people where you travel. It is not your intention to harm anyone and that you did not know that in Cuba there were people with whom you can talk and others with whom you cannot.
“The Cuban authorities use the label ‘counterrevolutionary’ freely against anyone they don’t like. Do not admit to having had contacts with someone who is ‘counterrevolutionary’ or who is against the government.
“Remember that your meetings have been with civil society actors and not with political activists of any kind. Any contact with individuals whom the government considers problematic should be explained as a fluke or out of curiosity because of what they have read in the newspapers ”.
source: Razones de Cuba (Cuba Reasons)