{"id":3052,"date":"2020-11-01T12:13:40","date_gmt":"2020-11-01T12:13:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/?p=3052"},"modified":"2020-11-01T12:13:43","modified_gmt":"2020-11-01T12:13:43","slug":"the-president-has-the-constitutional-power-to-unilaterally-terminate-the-embargo-on-cuba","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/the-president-has-the-constitutional-power-to-unilaterally-terminate-the-embargo-on-cuba\/","title":{"rendered":"The president has the constitutional power to unilaterally terminate the embargo on Cuba"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"747\" height=\"506\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuba-and-the-us.jpeg?resize=747%2C506&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3053\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuba-and-the-us.jpeg?w=1024&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuba-and-the-us.jpeg?resize=300%2C203&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuba-and-the-us.jpeg?resize=768%2C520&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 747px) 100vw, 747px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although it took a while, it is now commonly acknowledged that a president has the authority to unilaterally modify the United States embargo on Cuba. This power exists notwithstanding Congress\u2019s attempted <a href=\"https:\/\/scholarlycommons.law.case.edu\/cgi\/viewcontent.cgi?article=1522&amp;context=jil\">\u201ccodification\u201d<\/a> of the U.S. Treasury Department regulations that constitute that embargo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It remains little understood, though, that the president has the power to go beyond modifying the Cuban embargo, and indeed may terminate it once and for all.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That power exists despite a provision of the Helms-Burton Act that imposes <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/22\/6064\">political conditions<\/a> on Cuba that must be met before the embargo can be lifted by presidential action. In summary, the authority to unilaterally terminate the embargo on Cuba is based upon the constitutional primacy of the president\u2019s office in managing U.S. foreign relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Could anyone challenge such a unilateral presidential termination of the embargo on Cuba? Members of Congress might try, but would they meet the constitutional requirement of \u201cstanding\u201d to mount such a challenge in federal court? The answer is no, they would find it impossible to establish the \u201cstanding\u201d necessary to raise such a lawsuit because they would not be legally able to demonstrate actual personal harm arising from the embargo\u2019s end, which is something they must, but cannot, prove to achieve standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, for the sake of a complete analysis, we will assume for now that the standing of Congress members challenging a unilateral termination of the Cuban embargo is determined adequate by a court; what legal principles would a court apply in adjudicating whether a president has the power to end the embargo in defiance of the limits Congress attempted to impose in the Helms-Burton Act?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, it is a venerable principle\u2014both endorsed and repeatedly reaffirmed by the Judicial Branch\u2014that the conduct of the nation\u2019s foreign relations is a function that the Constitution entrusts to the president. It will not be permitted for that function to be usurped by Congress. Second, the \u201cpolitical question\u201d doctrine encapsulates the judges\u2019 desire to avoid entering into policy-based controversies rightly left to the elected branches of government. Whether the president or Congress is correct in their assessments of the desirability, or otherwise, of the Cuban embargo is precisely the kind of political question the courts of the United States have declined to adjudicate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Taken together, the overarching principles of presidential supremacy in foreign relations and the political question doctrine would preclude a successful congressional challenge to a unilateral presidential termination of the Cuban embargo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>An attempted congressional usurpation of U.S.-Cuba policy from the president<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The late Senator Jesse Helms and several Cuban American legislators designed the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 to strip President Clinton and his successors of the authority to end the Cuban embargo. They intended to achieve that goal by two means. First, the Act \u201ccodified\u201d the restrictions of the embargo to prevent the relaxation of its various elements by the Executive Branch. Second, it attempted to entomb in Congress what it believed to be a now-frozen (\u201ccodified\u201d) embargo. This second step was to be achieved by stipulating that the embargo could be terminated only if Cuba were to acquiesce in the transformation of its political, economic, and social systems, in accordance with the precise specifications of the Helms-Burton Act. Only then could a U.S. president end the embargo. Among the specified conditions that Cuba was required to meet: \u201cFree and fair elections\u201d must have been held in Cuba under the supervision \u201cof foreign observers;\u201d Cuba must be \u201csubstantially moving toward a market-oriented economic system;\u201d Cuba must have made \u201cdemonstrable progress in assuring the right to private property;\u201d Cuba must have permitted the \u201cunfettered\u201d deployment of \u201cinternational human rights monitors\u201d throughout the island; Cuba must release \u201call political prisoners;\u201d Cuba must also have given assurances that \u201cassistance\u201d will be provided for the \u201cCuban people;\u201d Cuba must have made \u201cdemonstrable progress in establishing an independent judiciary;\u201d and Cuba must have \u201clegalized all political activity;\u201d Cuba must not block reception of U.S. government-funded radio and television broadcasts (i.e. Radio and TV Mart\u00ed) that violate international communications treaties; and Cuba must have dissolved specified government agencies. The requirements can only be read as a demand for an unconditional surrender of sovereignty by Cuba in exchange for an end to the U.S. embargo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Notably though, the extensive requirements placed on Cuba by the Helms-Burton Act would be impossible to apply and police by a U.S. court. The ostensible adjectival standards of the statute are simply too vague or indeterminate to be applied. For example, if the president terminates the embargo and members of Congress sue to enforce the requirements that the Helms-Burton Act imposes on Cuba as an argument, a court would be asked to resolve the following questions: what exactly constitutes a \u201cpolitical prisoner?\u201d What constitutes \u201csubstantial movement to a market-oriented economy?\u201d What is a \u201cfull and fair election?\u201d How is \u201cthe right to private property\u201d meant to be defined? What is an \u201cunfettered\u201d human rights monitor? Predictably courts will decline the invitation to do the Congress\u2019s job in defining, beyond tossing around adjectives, precisely what is required of Cuba.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even if carefully drafted, not one of the above-cited requirements imposed on Cuba is binding on a U.S. president. He or she may terminate the embargo on Cuba with no more than a written declaration to that effect. Alternatively, a president may let the statutory authority for the embargo lapse in September of any given year by doing nothing to renew that <a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/STATUTE-91\/pdf\/STATUTE-91-Pg1625.pdf\">authority<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cThe President may extend the exercise of [the Trading with the Enemy Act, upon which the Cuban embargo is based] for one-year periods upon a determination for each such extension that the exercise of such authorities with respect to [Cuba] for another year is in the national interest of the United States.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There is simply nothing members of Congress can do regarding the means of embargo termination a president chooses. Some members of Congress, though, would like U.S. presidents to think otherwise. At the time of President Trump\u2019s June 2017 announcement in Miami of his administration\u2019s new Cuba policy there were preceding assertions of the primacy of the Helms-Burton Act and its preemptive effect on the formulation of U.S.-Cuba policy by any political actors other than Congress. The motive in those assertions was to convince Donald Trump that he is legally bound by the Helms-Burton Act to maintain a strict embargo on Cuba until the many and extreme conditions for termination of the statute are met by Cuba.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Then-Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson fell for Congress\u2019 efforts when he <a href=\"https:\/\/www.miamiherald.com\/news\/nation-world\/world\/americas\/cuba\/article162515728.html\">framed<\/a> U.S.-Cuba policy in congressionally-oriented terms, \u201cHow do we bring [the U.S.] into compliance with long standing statutory obligations? [\u2026] We think it is important that we take steps to restore the intent of the Helms-Burton legislation which was to put pressure on the regime to change.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In his Cuba policy announcement in Miami, President Trump likewise referenced the Helms-Burton Act and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefings-statements\/remarks-president-trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba\/\">said<\/a>: \u201cOur new policy begins with strictly enforcing U.S. law. We will not lift sanctions on the Cuban regime until all political prisoners are freed. Freedoms of assembly and expression are respected. All political parties are legalized. And free and internationally supervised elections are scheduled\u2026\u201d&nbsp;In so doing, Trump indicated a likely unwitting acceptance of Congress\u2019 attempted usurpation of his foreign relations prerogative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But he, or his successor, can learn that the self-proclaimed primacy of Congress with regard to the embargo on Cuba is preposterous when viewed through a constitutional lens. Trump, or any future president, can learn this simple truth and act on that knowledge to end the economic embargo against Cuba. In doing so they would achieve the foreign policy legacy that eluded President Obama notwithstanding his visit to Havana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The lesson for the Trump administration in the failed \u201ccodification\u201d of the embargo on Cuba<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In 2006, ten years after the enactment of Helms-Burton, Fidel Castro transferred his powers of state onto his brother Raul, and the U.S. Executive Branch remarkably claimed to be unable to respond to that event:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A State Department official said there would be no change in policy towards Cuba, whether Castro or his brother Raul were in charge, because of American laws restricting U.S. dealings with the communist government. \u201cThis is one of our most regimented policies. <em>Our hands are tied by laws<\/em>,\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/progresoweekly.us\/the-new-normalization\/\">said the official<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This was merely a repetition of the false wisdom that the Helms-Burton Act took embargo policy out of the hands of the Executive Branch by \u201ccodifying\u201d it. The most surprising aspect of this misstatement of constitutional authority is that it came from the Executive Branch itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The provision in the Helms-Burton Act that \u201ccodified\u201d the embargo on Cuba\u2014in the sense that it purported to remove the discretion of the president to modify the embargo\u2014<a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:22%20section:6032%20edition:prelim)\">reads<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Codification of Economic Embargo. The economic embargo of Cuba, as in effect on March 1, 1996, including all restrictions under part 515 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be in effect upon the enactment of this Act, and shall remain in effect, subject to section 204 of the Act (Helms-Burton Act).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The readily apparent problem with the \u201ccodification\u201d of the embargo is that it codified the Cuban regulations verbatim \u201cas in effect on March 1, 1996\u201d\u2014including the controlling provision, 31 C.F.R. \u00a7 515.201: \u201cAll transactions [involving Cuba] are prohibited <em>except<\/em><em>&nbsp;as<\/em><em>specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury <\/em><em>[\u2026]<\/em><em> by means of regulations, rulings, [and] licenses<\/em>\u201d. The Helms-Burton Act simply left untouched the Executive Branch\u2019s authority to modify the embargo on Cuba (i) by promulgating new regulations, (ii) by issuing specific licenses permitting new activities involving Cuba, or (iii) by generally licensing hitherto prohibited dealings with that country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Proof that such executive authority remained unimpaired was provided shortly after the Act\u2019s enactment when the Clinton administration invented a new category of authorized travel to Cuba under a general license, created to permit U.S. citizens to engage in \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/FR-1999-05-13\/pdf\/99-12083.pdf#page=7\">people-to-people<\/a>\u201d educational travel. Tellingly, Senator Helms did not challenge this rebuff of his \u201ccodification\u201d attempt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>President Clinton\u2019s Helms-Burton Act signing statement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">President Clinton did not offer significant opposition to Senator Helms\u2019 bill. Instead he relied on the advice of campaign operatives concerned about the South Florida vote in the reelection of 1996. So he remained quiet on the subject of the Helms-Burton legislation when it was before Congress. In the aftermath of two planes from Miami being shot down by the Cuban Air Force,&nbsp;he signed the bill into law. However, Clinton took an important step to preserve presidential authority over U.S.-Cuba policy by issuing a signing statement that <a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/WCPD-1996-03-18\/pdf\/WCPD-1996-03-18-Pg478.pdf\">said<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Consistent with the Constitution, I interpret the Act as not derogating from the president\u2019s authority to conduct foreign policy. A number of provisions could be read to state the foreign policy of the United States [\u2026] While I support the underlying intent of these sections, the president\u2019s constitutional authority over foreign policy necessarily entails discretion over these matters. Accordingly, I will construe these provisions to be <a href=\"https:\/\/www.merriam-webster.com\/dictionary\/precatory\">precatory<\/a>. The president must also be able to respond effectively to rapid changes in Cuba. This capability is necessary to ensure that we can advance our national interests in a manner that is conducive to a democratic transition in Cuba. Section 102(h), concerning the codification of the economic embargo, and the requirements for determining that a transitional or democratically elected government is in power, could be read to impose overly rigid constraints on the implementation of our foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Clinton\u2019s signing statement rejected both the codification of the embargo on Cuba <em>and<\/em> the purportedly binding nature of the requirements placed on Cuba (e.g., an independent judiciary) by the Helms-Burton Act for the termination of the embargo. In issuing his statement Clinton asserted the constitutional primacy of the president in foreign affairs. It is as accurate a description of the scope of the foreign policy prerogative of a U.S. president now as it was when he signed it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That Clinton\u2019s signing of the Helms-Burton legislation did nothing to legitimize the statute\u2019s attempt to usurp presidential authority over Cuba-U.S. policy was demonstrated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a case where President George W. Bush signed legislation that ordered the Department of State to issue passports stating Israel as the place of birth for any U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem. The Bush administration opposed the law because it presumed Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem when the U.S. policy was to preserve the status of the city for future multi-party negotiations. When he signed this legislation, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/WCPD-2002-10-07\/pdf\/WCPD-2002-10-07-Pg1658-2.pdf\">Bush issued a signing statement<\/a> rejecting the binding authority of the law:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If construed as mandatory rather than advisory, [the statute would] impermissibly interfere with the president\u2019s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States [and speak] for the nation in international affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The parents of a child born in Jerusalem filed a lawsuit to enforce the law and the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Bush administration won the case based on a traditional judicial deference to the longstanding prerogative of the president to conduct the country\u2019s foreign relations. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/13-628\">Zivotofsky\u2019s case<\/a> underscored the fact that signing a bill that derogates from the presidential foreign relations prerogative does not diminish a later assertion of that inherent constitutional power: And such is the case with Cuba and the Helms-Burton Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>An impermissible legislative veto<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As we have seen, the Helms-Burton Act purports to set out the requirements that Cuba must meet for the president to terminate the embargo. If the president acts to terminate the embargo and Congress disapproves of that action, the Act declares that the president\u2019s action will \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/104\/plaws\/publ114\/PLAW-104publ114.htm\">cease to be effective<\/a>\u201d once Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. Astonishingly, the above provision constitutes an impermissible legislative veto that congressional lawyers should have recognized immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Legislative vetoes were deemed unconstitutional and prohibited by the Supreme Court in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/462\/919\"><em>INS v. Chadha<\/em><\/a>. In that case, Chadha overstayed his student visa and a judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives vetoed the suspension and voted to overturn the Executive Branch\u2019s determination that Chadha be allowed to stay. The Supreme Court struck down that legislative action by ruling that it violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which enshrines the requirement that a congressional bill must be formally presented to the president for their signature, so that it may be vetoed or made lawo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because there is no provision for presentation to the president of the congressional joint resolution rendering the president\u2019s action \u201cineffective,\u201d if such a resolution is passed and then invoked in court against a president for failure to comply with the Helms-Burton Act\u2019s conditions for lifting the embargo on Cuba, the judge will simply strike it down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/104\/plaws\/publ114\/PLAW-104publ114.htm\">A section of the Helms-Burton Act<\/a> refers to the \u201cenactment of a joint resolution,\u201d but goes on to provide in the following subsection that \u201cFor purposes of this subsection, the term \u201cjoint resolution\u201d means only a joint resolution of the 2 Houses of Congress.\u201d In so doing, Congress omitted the requirement of presentation of the resolution to the president for his or her action. However, even if a presentment to the president of the joint resolution was intended, a president that terminates the embargo \u2013 notwithstanding the conditions prescribed for such termination by Helms-Burton \u2013 can hardly be expected to sign a joint resolution that would reverse his or her action in terminating the embargo. So the embargo would remain terminated notwithstanding Congressional passage of a joint resolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is unlikely that a court would pay much regard to arguments urging it to overturn a presidential action as contrary to the will of Congress, when that body\u2019s attempt at a mechanism to override the disputed action has been found to be unconstitutional or simply ineffectual because its ultimate fate lies with a president who has already deliberately acted contrary to the statute. In other words, Congress chose its remedy and when that remedy proves to be constitutionally defective or ineffectual, the Judicial Branch \u2013 a branch of government that, by constitutional design and its own preference, is to play no role in the formulation of the nation\u2019s foreign policies \u2013 will not invent a means of salvation for Congress\u2019 usurpation of the president\u2019s foreign affairs prerogative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Members of Congress do not have the standing to challenge a presidential termination of the embargo on Cuba<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In considering possible congressional reaction should a president simply lift the embargo, we should perhaps first ask whether members of Congress will do anything at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following the 1999 post-codification Cuban embargo reforms of President Clinton (e.g., the creation of new categories of authorized travel), Representative Ros-Lehtinen <a href=\"https:\/\/www.miamiherald.com\/news\/nation-world\/world\/americas\/cuba\/article162515728.html\">said<\/a>, \u201cwe want to know where is the legal controlling authority that authorizes them to change the law. The way we read Helms-Burton, they do not have any such authority.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There was talk of suing Clinton at the time, but nothing came of it. If the past is any guide, members of Congress will presumably take no action should the president terminate the embargo without requiring Cuba to conform to the myriad conditions of the Helms-Burton Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is worth noting that the Helms-Burton Act is something of an orphan statute. Fewer than ten of the one hundred senators at the time of its passage in 1996 remain in Congress and none of them strongly supported the Act at the time of its passage. It is therefore questionable whether they would bother to file a suit challenging a presidential termination of the embargo on Cuba.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If, however, they do elect to sue, the legal requirement of \u201cstanding\u201d will present a formidable challenge to a congressional litigant challenging Executive Branch action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Should individual members of Congress file suit, they will allege that the president has failed to follow the requirements of the Helms-Burton Act for the termination of the Cuban embargo. Before a court will even consider the merits of such a claim it will insist that the plaintiffs demonstrate constitutional standing. To do so they must show an injury-in-fact that is directly attributable to an alleged failure of the Executive Branch to follow the law in question. What member of Congress could sustain such a claim with respect to the Helms-Burton Act? The short answer is, not one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cStanding\u201d to bring suit must be affirmatively <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/504\/555\">established<\/a> by a plaintiff challenging an action of the Executive Branch. The Supreme Court has ruled that in order to have such standing to litigate a claim, a plaintiff must \u201callege [\u2026] a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The constitutional test for standing evolved by the judiciary requires that a plaintiff show that he or she has suffered (1) an injury-in-fact, which (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3) is redressable by a favorable judgment. Members of Congress challenging termination of the Cuban embargo by the president must state <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/504\/555\">a claim showing<\/a> an injury more personal and direct than simply an abstract interest in U.S.-Cuba policy. For example, in <em><a href=\"https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=10810643144743063686&amp;q=%22553+F.2d+190%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2006\">Harrington v. Bush<\/a><\/em>, the D.C. Circuit denied standing to a member of Congress who challenged the legality of certain acts of the CIA and claimed that they diminished his effectiveness as a legislator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Suits by members of Congress brought against the Executive Branch invoke complicated separation of powers concerns for the federal courts. Such concerns leave judges reluctant to open the courts to legislators when <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/moore-v-us-house-of-representatives\">they allege only<\/a> \u201cgeneralized, amorphous injuries due to [\u2026] the conduct of the Executive\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Members of Congress would not be able to demonstrate standing to challenge a president\u2019s unilateral lifting of the Cuban embargo, because they cannot show injuries to themselves attributable to that action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Judicial deference to presidential exercises of the office\u2019s foreign affairs prerogative<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A president\u2019s plenary prerogative to conduct the nation\u2019s foreign affairs has been central to the clear and expedient formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policies. The recognized need for the U.S. to speak with one voice in foreign matters has resulted in a president\u2019s actions being given extraordinary deference by the courts. In <em>United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.<\/em>, the Supreme Court <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/299\/304\">described the constitutional scope<\/a> of the president\u2019s authority over the nation\u2019s foreign policies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing with [\u2026] the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the president as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In foreign affairs-based court contests between Congress and presidents, the latter have always won. There is no reason to believe a suit by members of Congress challenging a unilateral termination of the embargo on Cuba will lead to a different result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The political question doctrine<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Courts, in deciding whether to adjudicate certain controversies, perform a \u201cpolitical question\u201d analysis which seeks to determine whether the question presented should be reserved for Congress and the president to resolve. That is, the courts must decide initially whether the matter is inherently political rather than legal, and, if so, they must leave it to what are called the \u201cpolitical branches\u201d of government to resolve, through such means as Congress\u2019 \u201cpower of the purse\u201d and \u201cadvice and consent\u201d to presidential appointments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In hearing a suit based on the Helms-Burton Act and its codification of the embargo against Cuba, a court would inevitably be asked to decide, effectively, whether the president or Congress has the better Cuba policy. This is something that the courts will not do. In <em>Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan<\/em>, a claim was brought by members of Congress arguing that President Reagan\u2019s aid to Contras amounted to waging war in violation of the <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sanchez-espinoza-v-reagan-2\">Constitution\u2019s war power clause<\/a>. The case was dismissed on the ground that the complaint amounted to a political question. Similarly, in <em>Crockett v. Reagan<\/em>, a claim brought by members of Congress that challenged the presence of military advisors in El Salvador as a violation of the War Powers Resolution and the war powers clause of the Constitution was <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/558\/893\/1809649\/\">also dismissed<\/a> as a political question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">President Obama attempted to normalize relations with Cuba. President Trump has strengthened sanctions against Cuba. Congress legislated conditions for ending the embargo. Given the level of past and present political discord relating to the U.S. embargo against Cuba, inviting a U.S. court to decide a given policy\u2019s wisdom will almost certainly be declined as a non-justiciable \u201cpolitical\u201d question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>International law is the law of the United States and U.S. Courts refuse to act contrary to that body of law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Should members of Congress sue to enforce the requirements demanded of Cuba by the Helms-Burton Act (e.g. Cuba must adopt a \u201cmarket-oriented economy\u201d), they will inevitably end up subjecting the Act\u2019s requirements to an international law-based review and analysis by a U.S. federal court. In <em>Paquete Habana<\/em> ,the Supreme Court said, \u201c[i]nternational law is part of our [U.S.] law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Whether or not it is legally permissible for the U.S. to coerce the transformation of Cuba\u2019s economic and political institutions is a question that can only be answered by a U.S. court through reference to the international law principle of nonintervention. As its name suggests, this principle holds that nations may not meddle in the internal affairs of other nations. As one eminent commentator <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/american-political-science-review\/article\/global-approach-to-national-policy-by-falk-richard-a-cambridge-mass-harvard-university-press-1975-pp-320-1250\/0B1FC8830B12FBCC9E3D67D50F0092C5\">said<\/a>, \u201cthe most fundamental postulate underlying the state system is the notion that one does not try to control political developments in foreign societies.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From its earliest days as an independent country, the U.S. has subscribed to the nonintervention principle. In the 1825 case of <em>The Antelope<\/em> where the U.S. Supreme Court said, \u201cno principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations\u2026 It results from this equality, that no one [nation] can rightfully impose a rule on another.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thomas Jefferson framed the matter in terms of the rights of nations as derived from natural law. \u201cEvery nation has, of natural right, entirely and exclusively, all the jurisdiction which may be rightfully exercised in the territory it occupies.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In <em>The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon<\/em>, a frequently-cited case in support of the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of a state over its territory, Chief Justice Marshall <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/11\/116\">said<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The jurisdiction of [a] nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution&nbsp;of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the present era, the International Court of Justice had <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/files\/case-related\/70\/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf\">this to say<\/a> on the matter of what is forbidden by the public international law principle of nonintervention:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[T]he principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In an early American case, <em>Murray v. The Charming Betsey<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that acts of Congress should not be interpreted to violate international law unless no other construction is possible. A later iteration of the Supreme Court\u2019s propensity to read statutes in ways that avoid congressional violations of international law is found in <em><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/542\/155\/\">F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. et al. v. Empagran S. A. et al<\/a>.<\/em>, where the Supreme Court held that it will construe statutes to avoid interference with other states\u2019 sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the case of the Helms-Burton Act, a court will be asked to rule that the statute\u2019s requirements placed on Cuba for the lifting of the embargo are illegitimate because they clearly violate Cuba\u2019s sovereignty. As a result, they violate international law. Because international law is the law of the U.S., it must be applied by U.S. courts. It follows that those courts, in conformity with that body of law, will deem the conditions for ending the embargo placed on Cuba as merely precatory and therefore unenforceable by members of Congress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>How the embargo may be terminated<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To end the embargo on Cuba the president may simply declare it terminated and issue the executive orders necessary to resume trade and investment with Cuba. Alternatively, the president may simply let the embargo die through non-extension. Authority for the Cuban embargo regulations stems from section five of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/USCODE-2011-title50\/html\/USCODE-2011-title50.htm\">Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).<\/a> In 1977, Congress amended section 5(b) to limit the president\u2019s power under the TWEA to time of war. At the same time Congress provided that any section 5(b) authorities being exercised with respect to Cuba on July 1, 1977, could continue to be exercised. <em>However, such authority will terminate unless extended annually by the president, for a further one-year period, upon the making of a written determination that such an extension is in the \u201cnational interest.<\/em><em>\u201d<\/em>Therefore all that is required to end the Cuban embargo is for a president to refuse, either actively or passively, to extend it when it comes up for its yearly renewal.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The president lifts the embargo: what happens next?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cuba and the U.S. are founding members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). When the WTO was established in 1995 both countries accepted the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as binding on all members. Article I of the Agreement prohibits signatories from discriminating among member nations when extending trade benefits. For example, if a nation grants another nation a particular customs duty rate on a product, it must grant that rate to all WTO members. This means that both the U.S. and Cuba must extend Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment to other members\u2019 exported products. Therefore, Cuban goods imported into the U.S. must receive entry terms as favorable as those extended to other WTO members\u2019 products.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, under Article XXI of the GATT a nation can opt out of its obligations to a particular nation by claiming it is \u201cnecessary for the protection of its essential security interests.\u201d In 1962 the U.S. invoked the Article XXI exemption of GATT when President Kennedy established the current embargo on Cuba. Kennedy\u2019s invocation has since remained in effect. Opting back into MFN treatment of Cuba is, though, a simple matter. All it will take for such status to apply to Cuban products is a stroke-of-a-pen presidential rescission of Kennedy\u2019s 1962 action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But even without a restoration of MFN status, Cuban products may be imported into the U.S. under <a href=\"https:\/\/www.usitc.gov\/\">Column II of the current tariff schedule<\/a>. Column II duties vary greatly, but most are quite modest or, in many cases, non-existent because duty does not apply to the product category. There is also an embargo <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/31\/515.582\">exception<\/a> available to items produced by \u201cindependent Cuban entrepreneurs as determined by the State Department.\u201d For example, Cuban coffee has been <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/latino\/nestle-s-nespresso-now-selling-cuban-coffee-u-s-market-n634286\">imported<\/a> into the U.S. by Nespresso without payable duty. Similarly, Amazon has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.miamiherald.com\/news\/nation-world\/world\/americas\/cuba\/article235516747.html\">sold<\/a> Cuban charcoal in the United States. Again, no duty applied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A representative item to which a Column II duty would apply (chosen at random for the purpose of illustration) is the Cuban beer, <em>Cristal<\/em>. The duty on it would be 9 cents per 355 ml. Column I duties (i.e. MFN) for beer are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.usitc.gov\/\">zero<\/a>. So, with or without MFN treatment, most Cuban products may competitively enter the U.S. market upon a presidential termination of the embargo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Obama\u2019s normalization initiative with Cuba ended up being too modest in scope to constitute an enduring foreign policy legacy. Truly normalized relations with Cuba will be characterized by an end to the U.S. embargo and the resumption of bilateral trade, as was the case with China. President Trump has the power to do both. If he chooses not to exercise that power, inevitably a future president will, and in so doing he or she will lay claim to the resulting legacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Robert L. Muse<\/em><\/strong> is a lawyer in private practice in Washington, D.C. He has written widely and testified on U.S. laws relating to Cuba before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives; the Canadian House of Commons; the U.S. International Trade Commission and the External Economic Relations Committee of the European Parliament (Brussels). He has spoken at many universities about U.S. law and policy regarding Cuba, including Columbia, Georgetown, Harvard, Fordham, and the Universities of California, Georgia, North Carolina and Havana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By Robert L. Muse\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Source: <a href=\"https:\/\/theglobalamericans.org\/2020\/10\/the-president-has-the-constitutional-power-to-unilaterally-terminate-the-embargo-on-cuba\/?fbclid=IwAR0FRSxkd_BENLtYu_tLCP-oPHoWdESCa_zD0udHtVT3JKJyTFsiPPUiXpc\" data-type=\"URL\" data-id=\"https:\/\/theglobalamericans.org\/2020\/10\/the-president-has-the-constitutional-power-to-unilaterally-terminate-the-embargo-on-cuba\/?fbclid=IwAR0FRSxkd_BENLtYu_tLCP-oPHoWdESCa_zD0udHtVT3JKJyTFsiPPUiXpc\">Global Americans<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction Although it took a while, it is now commonly acknowledged that a president has the authority to unilaterally modify the United States embargo on<a class=\"moretag\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/the-president-has-the-constitutional-power-to-unilaterally-terminate-the-embargo-on-cuba\/\"> [&#8230;]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":101011,"featured_media":3053,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_hide_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_featured_image_duplicate_dismissed":0,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[43],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3052","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-featured"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":3781,"url":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/just-leave-cuba-alone\/","url_meta":{"origin":3052,"position":0},"title":"Just Leave Cuba Alone","author":"Editorial Team","date":"February 23, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"Unfortunately, Joe Biden is your prime example of a standard Washington, D.C., politician. As such, as president he will just accept the status quo, defer to the national-security establishment, and do his best to make the welfare-warfare state function efficiently. That means that the U.S. policy of interventionism and regime\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;US Aggression&quot;","block_context":{"text":"US Aggression","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/category\/usa\/us-aggression\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuban-girls-1.jpeg?fit=1140%2C641&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuban-girls-1.jpeg?fit=1140%2C641&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuban-girls-1.jpeg?fit=1140%2C641&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuban-girls-1.jpeg?fit=1140%2C641&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuban-girls-1.jpeg?fit=1140%2C641&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":4601,"url":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/cuban-legislators-condemn-u-s-embargo-on-cuba\/","url_meta":{"origin":3052,"position":1},"title":"Cuban legislators condemn U.S. embargo on Cuba","author":"Editorial Team","date":"June 3, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"Cuban legislators on Friday condemned the six-decade U.S. embargo on the island. During a parliamentary hearing chaired by Esteban Lazo Hernandez, president of Cuba's National Assembly of People's Power, a group of deputies representing different fields of the society noted that the embargo violates international law and breaches the United\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Featured&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Featured","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/category\/news\/featured\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/havana-2.jpeg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/havana-2.jpeg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/havana-2.jpeg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/havana-2.jpeg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/havana-2.jpeg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":4770,"url":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/bidens-failure-to-end-trumps-war-on-cuba-is-threatening-lives\/","url_meta":{"origin":3052,"position":2},"title":"Biden\u2019s Failure to End Trump\u2019s War on Cuba Is Threatening Lives","author":"Editorial Team","date":"July 1, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"The president promised to return to Obama\u2019s policies of engagement with Cuba, but the embargo and other Trump-era restrictions remain in place. Imagine a country developing and producing its own Covid-19 vaccines, enough to cover its entire population, but being unable to inoculate everyone because of a syringe shortage. This\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Featured&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Featured","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/category\/news\/featured\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/vacine-cuba.jpeg?fit=474%2C266&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":5909,"url":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/a-genocide-they-call-embargo\/","url_meta":{"origin":3052,"position":3},"title":"A genocide they call embargo","author":"Editorial Team","date":"February 9, 2022","format":false,"excerpt":"The United States, an expert in psychological warfare and disinformation, affirms that they are applying an \u201ceconomic embargo\u201d against socialist Cuba, when the truth, reflected in their own secret documents, is an economic, commercial and financial war to starve an entire people and not their rulers, as they intend to\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Featured&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Featured","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/category\/news\/featured\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/o-CUBA-UNITED-STATES-NEGOTIATION-facebook.jpeg?fit=1200%2C600&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/o-CUBA-UNITED-STATES-NEGOTIATION-facebook.jpeg?fit=1200%2C600&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/o-CUBA-UNITED-STATES-NEGOTIATION-facebook.jpeg?fit=1200%2C600&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/o-CUBA-UNITED-STATES-NEGOTIATION-facebook.jpeg?fit=1200%2C600&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/o-CUBA-UNITED-STATES-NEGOTIATION-facebook.jpeg?fit=1200%2C600&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1375,"url":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/us-sanctions-disinformation-beware-the-wolf-in-sheeps-clothing\/","url_meta":{"origin":3052,"position":4},"title":"US sanctions disinformation: beware the wolf in sheep&#8217;s clothing","author":"Editorial Team","date":"April 14, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"Michael G. Kozak is the Acting Assistant Secretary for the U.S. State Department\u2019s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. As the most senior US public servant responsible for trade with Cuba you would expect him to know exactly the value of US medicines and medical equipment exported to Cuba. After all,\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Covid-19&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Covid-19","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/category\/cuba\/covid-19\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/Wolf_in_sheep_skin_yellowEyes.jpg?fit=960%2C720&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/Wolf_in_sheep_skin_yellowEyes.jpg?fit=960%2C720&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/Wolf_in_sheep_skin_yellowEyes.jpg?fit=960%2C720&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/Wolf_in_sheep_skin_yellowEyes.jpg?fit=960%2C720&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":4741,"url":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/adopting-annual-resolution-delegates-in-general-assembly-urge-immediate-repeal-of-embargo-on-cuba-especially-amid-global-efforts-to-combat-covid-19-pandemic\/","url_meta":{"origin":3052,"position":5},"title":"Adopting Annual Resolution, Delegates in General Assembly Urge Immediate Repeal of Embargo on Cuba, Especially amid Global Efforts to Combat COVID-19 Pandemic","author":"Editorial Team","date":"June 26, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"The General Assembly today adopted a resolution addressing the decades-long United States embargo against Cuba, as delegates called for an immediate end to the sanctions, particularly amid global efforts to fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. In adopting the draft resolution \u201cNecessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Cuba&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Cuba","link":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/category\/cuba\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/united-nations.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/united-nations.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/united-nations.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/united-nations.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/united-nations.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p3xdTY-Ne","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-content\/uploads\/cuba-and-the-us.jpeg?fit=1024%2C693&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3052","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101011"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3052"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3052\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3053"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3052"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3052"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cubasupport.ie\/latest\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3052"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}